We study private computations in information-theoretical settings on networks that are not 2-connected. Non-2-connected networks are "non-private" in the sense that most functions cannot privately be computed on them. We relax the notion of privacy by introducing lossy private protocols, which generalize private protocols. We measure the information each player gains during the computation. Good protocols should minimize the amount of information they lose to the players. Throughout this work, privacy always means 1-privacy, i.e. players are not allowed to share their knowledge. Furthermore, the players are honest but curious, thus they never deviate from the given protocol.
knowledge. Furthermore, the players are honest but curious, thus they never deviate from the given protocol.
The randomness used by the protocol yields distributions on communication strings for each player and for each input. We define the loss of a protocol to a player as the logarithm of the number of different probability distributions the player can observe. This is justified since we prove that in optimal protocols, the distributions have pairwise disjoint support. Thus, the players can easily distinguish them, and the logarithm of their number is the number of bits the player learns.
The simplest non-2-connected networks consists of two blocks that share one bridge node. We prove that on such networks, communication complexity and the loss of a private protocol are closely related: Up to constant factors, they are the same.
Then we study one-phase protocols, an analogue of one-round communication protocols. In such a protocol each bridge node may communicate with each block only once. We investigate in which order a bridge node should communicate with the blocks to minimize the loss of information. In particular, for symmetric functions it is optimal to sort the components by increasing size. Then we design a one-phase protocol that for symmetric functions simultaneously minimizes the loss at all nodes where the minimum is taken over all one-phase protocols.
Finally, we prove a phase hierarchy. For any k there is a function such that every (k − 1)-phase protocol for this function has an information loss that is exponentially greater than that of the best k-phase protocol.
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Introduction
Consider a set of players, each knowing an individual secret. They want to compute some function depending on their secrets. But after the computation, no player should know anything about the secrets of the other players except for what he is able to deduce from his own secret and the function value. This is the aim of private computation (also called secure multi-party computation). To compute the function, the players can send messages to each other using secure links.
An example for such a computation is the "secret voting problem": The members of a committee wish to decide whether the majority votes for yes or no. But after the vote nobody should know anything about the opinions of the other members, not even about the exact number of yes and no votes, except for whether the majority voted for yes or no.
If no group of at most t players can infer anything about the input bits that cannot be inferred from the function value and their own input bits, we speak of t-privacy.
Any Boolean function can privately (in the following we identify privately with 1-privately) be computed on any 2-connected network. Unfortunately, there are many Boolean functions, even simple ones like parity, disjunction, or conjunction, that cannot privately be computed if the underlying network is not 2-connected [6] .
However, many real-world networks are not 2-connected and private computation is not possible. If the players in the network have to compute something but do not trust each other, there is a natural interest of the players in privacy. What can we do? We relax the notion of privacy: One cannot require that any player learns only what he is able to deduce from his own secret and the function value. Instead we require that any player learns as little as possible about the secrets of the other players (in an information-theoretical sense) while it is still possible to compute the function.
Bridge nodes are important when considering non-2-connected networks. For all non-bridge players we can guarantee that they do not learn anything except for what they can deduce from their own bit and the function value. Thus, the bridge players are the only players that are able to learn something more. The question is how much the bridge players need to learn such that the function can be computed. The simplest setting is a network of two blocks with one bridge node in common. (A block is a maximal 2-connected subnetwork.) This reminds one of communication complexity with a man in the middle: Alice (one block) and Bob (another block) want to compute a function depending on their input while preventing Eve (the bridge node) from learning anything about their input. Unfortunately, Eve listens to the only communication channel between Alice and Bob. In terms of communication complexity, this problem has been examined by Modiano and Ephremedis [14, 15] and Orlitsky and El Gamal [17] under cryptographic security. In contrast, we deal with informationtheoretical security, i.e. the computational power of the players is unrestricted. Furthermore, we are not interested in minimizing communication but in minimizing the information learned by any player. It turns out that there is a close relation between communication and privacy, at least in this special case.
Previous Results
Private computation was introduced by Yao [21] . He considered the problem under cryptographic assumptions. Private Computation with information-theoretical security has been introduced by Ben-Or et al. [4] and Chaum et al. [7] . Kushilevitz et al. [13] proved that the set of Boolean functions that have a circuit of linear size equals the set of functions that can privately be computed using only a constant number of random bits. Some of the simulation techniques used in this paper are based on their work.
Kushilevitz [11] and Chor et al. [9] considered private computations of integervalued functions. They examined which functions can privately be computed by two players.
Franklin and Yung [10] used directed hypergraphs for communication and described those networks on which every Boolean function can privately be computed.
While all Boolean functions can privately be computed on any undirected 2-connected network, Bläser et al. [6] completely characterized the class of Boolean functions that can still privately be computed, if the underlying network is connected but not 2-connected. In particular, no non-degenerate function can privately be computed if the network consists of three or more blocks. On networks with two blocks, only a small class of functions can privately be computed. Beimel [3] characterizes which non-Boolean functions can still be computed if the underlying networks are not 2-connected.
Ben-Or et al. [4] and Chaum et al. [7] proved that any Boolean function can privately be computed, if at most one third of the participating players are dishonest, i.e. they are cheating. We consider the setting that all players are honest, i.e. they do not cheat actively but try to acquire knowledge about the input bits of the other players only by observing their communication. For this model, Ben-Or et al. [4] proved that any n-ary Boolean function can be computed n−1 2 -privately. Chor and Kushilevitz [8] showed that if a Boolean function can be computed at least n 2 -privately, then it can be computed n-privately as well.
The idea of relaxing the privacy constraints has been studied to some extent in a cryptographic setting. Yao [21] examined the problem of what can be computed privately if polynomial-time bounded players should be unable to learn anything.
Leakage of information in the information-theoretical sense has been considered only for two parties as yet. Bar-Yehuda et al. [2] studied the minimum amount of information about the input that must be revealed for computing a given function in this setting.
Our Results
We study the leakage of information for multi-party protocols, where each player knows only a single bit of the input.
Our first contribution is the definition of lossy private protocols, which is a generalization of private protocols in an information-theoretical sense (Sect. 2.3). Here and in the following, private always means 1-private. Throughout this work, we restrict ourselves to non-2-connected (in the sense of non-2-vertex-connected) networks that are still 2-edge-connected. Every block in such a network has size at least three and private computation within such a block is possible. We measure the information any particular player gains during the execution of the protocol in an informationtheoretical sense. This is the loss of the protocol to the player. The players are assumed to be honest but curious. This means that they always follow the protocol but try to derive as much information as possible.
We divide lossy protocols into phases. Within a phase, a bridge player may exchange messages only once with each block it belongs to. Phases correspond to rounds in communication complexity but they are locally defined for each bridge player.
In the definition of lossy protocols, the loss of a protocol to a player is merely the logarithm of the number of different probability distributions on the communication strings a player can observe. We justify this definition in Sect. 3.2: For a protocol with minimum loss to a player P and any particular content of P 's random tape, the different distributions P observes have disjoint support, i.e. the support of any two probability distributions is disjoint. Thus, in order to gain information, P can distinguish the distributions from the actual communication he observes and does not need to sample.
The simplest non-2-connected network consists of two blocks that share one bridge node. In Sect. 4 we show that the communication complexity of a function f and the loss of a private protocol for f are intimately connected: Up to constant factors, both quantities are equal.
Then we study one-phase protocols. We start with networks that consist of d blocks that all share the same bridge player P . In a one-phase protocol, P can communicate only once with each block he belongs to. However, the loss of the protocol may depend on the order in which P communicates with the blocks. In Sect. 6, we show that the order in which P should communicate with the blocks to minimize the loss equals the order in which d parties should be ordered on a directed line when they want to compute the function with minimum communication complexity. Particularly for symmetric functions, it is optimal to sort the components by increasing size.
Then we design a one-phase protocol (Theorem 6.8), which has the remarkable feature that it achieves minimum loss at any node for symmetric functions. Hence, it simultaneously minimizes the loss for all nodes where the minimum is taken over all one-phase protocols.
In Sect. 7, we prove a phase hierarchy. For any k there is a function for which every (k − 1)-phase protocol has an exponentially greater information loss than that of the best k-phase protocol.
We conclude with two examples. The first example shows that even for symmetric functions, the order of the communication may have an exponentially large influence on the loss of the protocol. The second example is a non-symmetric function computed on a network with two bridge nodes. We show that it is impossible to minimize the information loss simultaneously by one protocol for both bridge players. This observation shows that, in contrast to symmetric functions, there are non-symmetric functions that do not have optimal one-phase protocols.
Comparison of Our Results with Previous Work
One of the important features of the two-party case is that at the beginning each party has knowledge about one half of the input. In the multi-party case each player knows only a single bit of the input.
Kushilevitz [11] examined which integer-valued functions can privately be computed by two players. He showed that requiring privacy can result in exponentially larger communication costs and that randomization does not help in this model, not even to improve on the number of rounds. Chor et al. [9] considered multi-party computations of functions over the integers. They showed that the possibility of privately computing a function is closely related to its communication complexity, and they characterized the class of privately computable Boolean functions on countable domains. Neither Kushilevitz [11] nor Chor et al. [9] examined the problem of how non-private functions can still be computed while maintaining as much privacy as possible.
Leakage of information in the information-theoretical sense has been considered only for two parties, each holding one n-bit input of a two-variable function. BarYehuda et al. [2] investigated this for functions that are not privately computable. They defined measures for the minimum amount of information about the individual inputs that must be learned during the computation and proved tight bounds on these costs for several functions. Finally, they showed that sacrificing some privacy can reduce the number of communication messages required during the computation and proved that at the costs of revealing k extra bits of information any function can be computed using O(k · 2 (2n+1)/(k+1) ) communication messages. Recall that private computations of private functions on domain {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n might take up to (2 n ) communication messages [11] .
The counterpart of the two-party scenario in the distributed setting that we consider is a network that consists of two complete networks that share one node connecting them. Simulating any two-party protocol on such a network allows the common player to gain information depending on the deterministic communication complexity of the function that should be evaluated. Hence, and in contrast to the two-party case, increasing the number of bits exchanged does not help to reduce the knowledge learned by the player that is part of either block. An important difference between the two-party scenario, where two parties share the complete input, and a network consisting of two 2-connected components connected via a common player (the bridge player) is that in the latter we have somewhat like a "man in the middle" (namely the bridge player) who can learn more than any other player in either component, since he can observe the whole communication.
Preliminaries

Notations
For i ∈ N, let [i] := {1, . . . , i}. We define B = {0, 1}.
Let x = x 1 x 2 · · · x n ∈ B n be a string of length n. Throughout the paper, we often use the string operation x I ←α defined as follows: For x ∈ B n , I ⊆ [n], and α ∈ B |I | , x I ←α is defined by 
For better readability we use sometimes x[I ] instead of x I . An undirected graph G = (V , E) is called 2-connected, if the graph obtained from G by deleting an arbitrary node is still connected. For a set U ⊆ V , let G| U := (U, E| U ) denote the graph induced by U , where E| U = {{x, y} ∈ E | x, y ∈ U }. A subgraph G| U is called a block of G, if G| U is 2-connected and there is no proper superset U of U such that G| U is 2-connected. We here consider a graph with two nodes and one edge connecting these two nodes as 2-connected. A graph is called 2-edge-connected if after removal of one edge, the graph is still connected. Note that a graph is 2-edge-connected if it is connected and has no block of size 2. A node belonging to more than one block is called a bridge node. The other nodes are called internal nodes. The blocks of a graph are arranged in a tree structure. For more details on graphs we refer to Berge [5] .
A Boolean function is called symmetric if the function value depends only on the number of 1s in the input. See for instance Wegener [20] for a survey on Boolean functions.
Private Computations
We consider the computation of Boolean functions f : B n → B on a network of n players. In the beginning, each player knows a single bit of the input x. Each player P i is equipped with a random tape R i . The players can send messages to other players via point-to-point communication using secure links where the link topology is given by an undirected graph G = (V , E). When the computation stops, all players should know the value f (x). The goal is to compute f (x) such that no player learns anything about the other input bits in an information-theoretical sense except for the information he can deduce from his own bit and the result. Such a protocol is called private.
Definition 2.1
Let C i be a random variable of the communication string seen by player P i , and let c be a particular string seen by P i . A protocol A for computing a function f is private with respect to player P i if for any pair of input vectors x and y with f (x) = f (y) and x i = y i , for every c, and for every random string r provided to P i ,
where the probability is taken over the random strings of all other players. A protocol A is private if it is private with respect to every player P i .
In the following, we use a strengthened definition of privacy of protocols: We allow only one player, say P i , to know the result. The protocol has to be private with respect to P i according to Definition 2.1. Furthermore, for all players P j = P i , for all inputs x, y with x j = y j , and for all random strings r we require Pr[
and f (y). In such a protocol, P i is the only player that learns the function value. The other players do not learn anything.
This definition does not restrict the class of functions computable by private protocols according to Definition 2.1. Every function f in this class can be computed by a protocol A fulfilling the conditions above. To achieve this additional restriction, P i generates a random bit r. Then we use a private protocol for computing r ⊕ f (x). Since the protocol used is private, no player except for P i learns anything about the function value that cannot be derived from its own input bit.
Information Source
The definition of privacy basically states the following: The probability that a player P i sees a specific communication string during the computation does not depend on the input of the other players. Thus, P i cannot infer anything about the other inputs from the communication he observes. If private computation is not possible since the graph is not 2-connected, it is natural to weaken the concept of privacy in the following way: We measure the information player P i can infer from seeing a particular communication string. This leads to the concept of lossy private protocols. The less information any player can infer, the better the protocol is.
In the following, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , . . . denotes a fixed enumeration of all communication strings seen by any player during the execution of A. (We could also use a fixed standard enumeration of all strings. In the latter case, we would get probability distributions with a finite support on countable probability spaces instead of probability distributions on finite spaces. The concepts arising would be completely the same.) Definition 2.2 Let C i be a random variable of the communication string seen by player P i while executing A. Then for a, b ∈ B and for every random string r provided to P i , define the information source of P i on a, b, and r as
and the probability is taken over the random strings of all other players.
Basically S A (i, a, b, r) is the set of all different probability distributions on the communication strings observed by P i when the input x of the players varies over all possible bit strings with x i = a and f (x) = b and P i 's random tape is fixed to r.
The loss of a protocol A on a, b with respect to player P i is
Thus the protocol loses bits of information to P i . We call such a protocol -lossy on a, b with respect to P i . If a uniform distribution of the input bits is assumed, then the entropy of an assignment to the players P 1 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n is equal to n − 1 [18, 19] . In this case the maximum number of bits of information that can be extracted by P i is n − 1. If A is 0-lossy for all a, b ∈ B with respect to P i , then we say that A is lossless with respect to P i . A is lossless to P i if and only if A is private to P i . Thus the notion of lossy private protocols generalizes the notion of private protocols.
Next we treat the loss to each player.
Let f be an n-ary Boolean function and let G = (V , E) be a network with |V | = n. 
4).
Sometimes we will use the size of the information source instead of A . Therefore, for a protocol A, we define a, b) . If the underlying protocol is clear from the context, we omit the subscript A. Let f be an n-ary Boolean function. For a network
If a player P i is an internal node of the network, then it is possible to design protocols that are lossless with respect to P i (see Sect. 3.1). Players that are bridge nodes are in general able to infer some information about the input.
Phases in a Protocol
Without loss of generality we will assume that for any protocol the players communicate with each other in rounds such that in every round each player P q may send one bit to one of its neighbors in the underlying communication network, or may receive one bit from one of its neighbors, or P q may be idle. We call such protocols synchronous. The fact that each player receives or sends at most one bit per round is only made to simplify some of the following definitions. (If a player sends or receives more than one bit in a single round in a given protocol, then we can design a new protocol that fulfills this restriction by simulating this one round by several rounds and sending bits consecutively.) For a player P q we encode a complete communication string as a sequence c = c [1] , c [2] 
, . . . , c[t] such that every item c[i] completely describes the i-th communication round performed by P q (in particular c[i]
encodes the name of the player P q has communicated with in the i-th round and the content of the message).
We say that P q who corresponds to a bridge node makes an alternation if he finishes the communication with one block and starts to communicate with another block. (This is well-defined, since each player receives or sends at most one bit per round.) Formally, we say that P q makes an alternation between the round i and i + 
a subsequence of c such that
• i j −1 = 0 or P q makes an alternation between the rounds i j −1 and i j −1 + 1, • i j = t or P q makes an alternation between the rounds i j and i j + 1, and • P q makes no alternation inside unit j (c).
Next we partition the work of P q into phases as follows. P q starts at the beginning of the first phase and it initiates a new phase when, after an alternation, it starts to communicate again with a block it already has communicated with previously in a phase.
Definition 2.4
A protocol A is a k-phase protocol for a bridge node P q if for every input string and contents of the random tapes of all players, P q works in at most k phases. A is called a k-phase protocol if it is a k-phase protocol for every bridge node.
The start and end round of each phase does not need to be the same for each player. Of particular interest are one-phase protocols. In such a protocol, each bridge player may only communicate once with each block he belongs to. Such protocols seem to be natural, since they have a local structure. Once the computation is finished in one block, the protocol will never communicate with this block again.
For k-phase protocols we define k G (i, a, b) and s k G (i, a, b) in a similar way as A and s G in the general case, but we minimize over all k-phase protocols.
During each phase a player communicates with at least two blocks. The order in which the player communicates within a phase can matter. The communication order σ q of a bridge node P q specifies the order in which P q communicates with the blocks during the whole computation. Formally, σ q is a finite sequence of (the indices of) blocks P q belongs to and the length of σ q is the total number of alternations made by P q plus one. We say that a protocol is σ q -ordered for P q if for all inputs and all contents of the random tapes, the communication order of P q is consistent with σ q . Let P q 1 , . . . , P q k with q 1 < q 2 < · · · < q k be an enumeration of all bridge players of a network G and σ = (σ q 1 , . . . , σ q k ) be a sequence of communication orders. We call a protocol σ -ordered if it is σ q j -ordered for every P q j . Finally, define
Communication Protocols
For comparing the communication complexity of a certain function with the loss of private protocols while computing this function, we need the following definitions. For more information about communication complexity, we refer to Kushilevitz and Nisan [12] .
Then x is the input for the first party, Alice, and y is the input for the second party, Bob.
Let B be a deterministic two-party communication protocol for computing f according to the distribution described above. Then DC(B, x, y) is the total number of bits exchanged by Alice and Bob when executing B on x and y. The deterministic communication complexity of B is
CP(B) denotes the number of different communication strings that occur, i.e. the protocol partition number. Finally,
and
The protocol partition number is the number of leaves in the protocol tree. The messages sent so far determine whether Alice or Bob sends the next message, i.e. we require that in every round of communication the set of all possible messages is prefix-free.
We also consider multi-party communication with a referee, which is a generalization of two-party communication. Therefore, we consider Boolean functions
. . , A k be k parties and R be a referee, all with unlimited computational power. For computing f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) for x i ∈ B m i , the parties and the referee proceed as follows:
The referee R does not know anything about any x i .
• The protocol proceeds in rounds. In a single round, R can communicate (i.e. receive or send a message) only with a single player.
• After finishing the communications, R computes the result of f (x 1 , . . . , x k ). Definition 2.6 Let B be a deterministic communication protocol for computing f with k parties and a referee as described above. Then DC(B, x 1 , . . . , x k ) is the total number of bits exchanged by the parties and the referee when executing B on
CP R (B) denotes the number of different communication strings that occur, i.e. the protocol partition number. DC R (f ) and CP R (f ) are defined analogously to Definition 2.5 by minimizing over all protocols for computing f .
The Suitability of the Model
The aim of this section is to justify the definitions given in Sect. 2. We have restricted ourselves to considering networks that are 2-edge-connected. Thus, any block has size at least three. Every Boolean function can be computed with three or more players [4] . Hence, it is possible to compute functions privately within any block.
In the next subsection, we argue that it is sufficient to consider bridge players when talking about the loss of a protocol. In Sect. 3.2, we prove that in optimal protocols, the probability distributions observed by any player have pairwise disjoint support. Thus, any player can easily distinguish the different probability distributions he observes.
Internal Players Do Not Learn Anything
Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to considering the loss of protocols to bridge players. The aim of this section is to justify this restriction. We prove that any protocol can be modified without increasing the loss to each bridge player such that no internal player (i.e. player who is not a bridge player) learns anything.
Theorem 3.1 For any protocol A on a 2-edge-connected G there exists a protocol
A on G computing the same function as A such that
the loss of A to each internal player is zero and 2. the loss of A to each bridge player is at most the loss of A to this bridge player.
Proof We assume that A is synchronous. Thus, the communication string a player receives in any round depends on the input bits, the random tapes, and the communication prior to this round of all players. Let C i,t denote the communication received by P i up to round t. We have
for some suitable function f i,t . Since we only consider graphs where each block has size at least three, we can compute f i,t privately according to the protocol of Kushilevitz et al. [13] such that for any i ∈ [n] and any round t we have the following properties:
• If P i is an internal player, then he knows C i,t masked by sufficiently many random bits while some other player knows these random bits.
• If P i is a bridge player, he knows C i,t .
The protocol A presented is clearly lossless with respect to any internal player. Furthermore, the loss to any bridge player is the same as in the protocol A.
Extracting Information from Probability Distributions
We consider arbitrary 1-connected networks. Let f be a Boolean function and A be a protocol for computing f on a 1-connected network G. Let P q be a bridge player of G, a, b ∈ B, and r q be the random string provided to P q . We define
and for any communication string c
where
For every communication string c that can be observed by P q on some input x ∈ X, P q can deduce that x ∈ ψ(c). Since the proofs of this and the next theorem need tools developed in the next section, we defer their proofs to Sect. 5.
The next result says that s G (q, a, b) is a tight lower bound on the number of pieces of information: the lower bound is achieved when executing an optimal protocol on G. Let μ and μ be two probability distributions over the same set of elementary events. They have disjoint support if, for any event c, we have μ(c) = 0 or μ (c) = 0. In this case, the probability distributions can be distinguished easily. 
Communication Complexity and Private Computation
In this section we investigate the relations between deterministic communication complexity and the minimum size of an information source in a connected network with one bridge node. To distinguish between protocols in terms of communication complexity and protocols in terms of private computation, we will call the former communication protocols.
Two-party Model
The communication complexity of two-party protocol and the protocol partition number are closely related. [12] 
Lemma 4.1 (Kushilevitz and Nisan
In this subsection we investigate the relation between the protocol partition number and the size of an information source on graphs G of n nodes that consist of two blocks sharing one bridge node P q . Let m 1 + 1 be the size of the first block and m 2 + 1 be size of the second one.
Let f : B n → B be an arbitrary function. We will relate the minimum size of an information source s G (q, a) for f and the optimum partition number for function f q←a , for any a ∈ B. In the model of private computation the input bits are distributed among n players whereas the input bits in a communication protocol are distributed among the two parties. We identify the input a of Alice with the m 1 input bits known by players of the first block of the network and the input b of Bob with the m 2 input bits known by the players of the second block. Additionally, we assume that the value of P q 's input bit x q is known by both Alice and Bob, so they know which function to compute: f q←0 or f q←1 .
Lemma 4.2 For a ∈ B, we have s G (q, a) ≤ CP(f q←a ).
Proof Consider an optimal deterministic protocol for computing f q←a . Then there are two functions A : B m 1 × B → B and B : B m 2 × B → B that describe the messages sent by Alice and Bob, respectively:
where λ denotes the empty string. By an appropriate encoding, we can assert that all messages sent are of equal length and that the number of rounds is the same for all inputs. This does not increases the communication size.
To compute f player P q first broadcasts the value of x q to the remaining players to inform them which functions should be computed next. Note that both A and B may depend on a. Then P q computes the values w i iteratively using A and B. Both functions can privately be computed in the first and second block, respectively, using Ben-Or et al.'s protocol [4] while P q is the only player who knows the w i s. Finally, P q computes the result. The number of different probability distributions observable by P q on the different inputs equals CP(f q←a ) by construction.
Broadcasting the value of the input bit seems to be very unusual in the context of private computations. In fact, this implies that the above protocol is not private with respect to the internal players. However, using Theorem 3.1, one can easily modify our protocol in such a way that it becomes private with respect to all internal players.
Lemma 4.3 For a ∈ B, we have CP(f q←a ) ≤ s G (q, a).
Proof Let P 1 , . . . , P q and P q , . . . , P n be the players of the first and second block, respectively. Let A be a protocol for computing f that is private with respect to all players except for P q and such that the size s A (q, a) is minimal.
We construct a communication protocol by simulating A and searching the lexicographical minimum communication sequence for P q that has positive probability.
Let c = c [1] If a party eventually knows the function value, the party sends it to the other party. Then the communication stops. This last message will be marked appropriately. Thus, the messages observed are prefix-free.
It remains to show that whenever Alice and Bob generate two different communication sequences on two inputs x and x , then P q observes two different probability distributions on x and x . Assume that we observe c and c on x and x , respectively. . Thus, the two probability distributions differ.
Due to the construction, we obtain from a communication protocol acting in k rounds a private protocol that needs at most k+1 2
phases. Analogously, we obtain from a k-phase private protocol a communication protocol that needs at most 2k − 1 rounds.
From the above lemmas, we immediately get the following theorem. • 
Multi-party with Referee
In this section we generalize our previous results to multi-party communication. We generalize Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 by showing that similar bounds hold if we compare the information source of a bridge player that is connected to more than two blocks with the size of a communication protocol that makes use of a referee. Through the section we assume that graph G of n nodes consist of k blocks sharing the bridge node P q . Let m 1 , . . . , m k , with 1 + m 1 + m 2 + · · · + m k = n, be the sizes of connected subgraphs G 1 , . . . , G k obtained from G after removing P q and let f : B n → B be an arbitrary function. We will relate s G (q, a) for f and the optimum partition number CP R for function f q←a , for any a ∈ B. In the model of private computation the input bits are distributed among n players and the input bits in a communication protocol are distributed among the k parties. We identify the input v i of the ith party with the m i input bits known by players of G i . We assume that the value of the input bit x q is known by all parties.
Lemma 4.6 For a ∈ B we have s G (q, a) ≤ CP R (f q←a ).
Proof Let B be a deterministic communication protocol for f q←a . We construct a protocol that is private with respect to all players except for bridge players. Furthermore, we show that the size of the information source of P q is bounded by CP R (B). The function B can always be evaluated by the bridge player P q and T B(w j −1 ) can be computed on the B(w j −1 )-th block and the players that are reachable from the players in the B(w j −1 )-th block without passing P q such that only P q knows the result of the computation and no internal player learns anything. By iterating these computations, P q can generate the complete communication sequence and finally compute the result.
The distribution of the communication seen by P q is uniquely determined by the communication sequence of the communication protocol, since it does not depend on the random strings of the players. From this observation, the lemma follows.
Next we show how to simulate the computation of a protocol A by a communication protocol B with a referee. One can easily generalize the simulation in Lemma 4.3 for this case such that on a given input x the parties communicate with a referee generating a communication string c which is the lexicographically first communication sequence for P q on x that has positive probability, i.e. we have μ x (c) > 0. The main drawback of such simulation is that it does not guarantee the minimum number of communication strings generated by B. Particularly, if we have a protocol A for f such that for some a, b ∈ B and some communication string c it holds μ x (c) > 0 for all x ∈ B n with x q = a and f (x) = b, then the communication string generated by our simulation with parameter w = c is the same for all such inputs x. This property plays a crucial role in proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.
To describe our simulation we need to provide the following notion. For a communication string w we define the weighted lexicographic order ≤ w lex as follows. Let c 1 , c 2 be arbitrary communication strings. Without loss of generality we assume that any protocol sends as a last message a unique message indicating the end of the computation. Hence, particularly neither w can be a prefix of c i nor c i a prefix of w. Denote by t, 1 , 2 the numbers of units of w, c 1 , and c 2 , respectively. Let = min{t, 1 , 2 }. Define 
(c) > 0} and {c : μ x (c) > 0} then the communication string of B during the simulation on x is the same as during the simulation on x .
Proof Let V 1 , . . . , V k be a partition of all players except for P q into subsets of maximum cardinality, such that for each set V k and every pair P i , P j ∈ V k the player P i is reachable from P j without passing P q . Let r q be P q 's random bits and w be an arbitrary communication string. We construct a communication protocol by simulating A and searching the minimum communication sequence according to ≤ w lex for P q that has positive probability.
Let c be the communication string observed by P q for a fixed content r 1 , . . . , r n of the random tapes and input x. Every unit sequence unit j (c) of c is associated with a subset V k and can deterministically be computed from the contents of the random tapes of the players in V k ∪ {P q }, the input of these players, and unit i (c) with i < j. Analogously, the index d of the subset V d that is associated to the unit sequence unit j +1 (c) can be determined from r q , x q , and the subsequences unit i (c) with i ≤ j . Let h(r q , x q , unit 1 (c) · · · unit j (c)) be the function that determines this index.
We say that a string c is a valid prefix, if it can be extended to a communication string c, i.e. c = c u for some string u such that μ x (c) > 0 and P q makes an alternation in c between c and u.
Let R 0 i be the sets of all possible contents of the random tapes of the players in V i and let α 0 = λ be the empty string. Furthermore, let x i be the input of the players in V i . We simulate the private protocol A as follows: Initially, referee R sends r q and x q to all parties A 1 , . . . , A k . Then we do the following iteratively for j = 1, 2, . . . : From Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, we get the following theorem. a ∈ B we have s G (q, a) = CP R (f q←a ).
Theorem 4.8 For
Proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
Now we are capable of giving the missing proofs in Sect. 3. Theorem 3.2 follows directly from the Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 below. Theorem 3.3 follows from Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.1 Assume A is a protocol for computing f . Then we have the following implications for every communication stringĉ:
Proof Item (i) follows from the definition of ψ in a straight-forward way. To prove Item (ii) assume that there exists a communication stringĉ with ψ(ĉ) = X. From Lemma 4.7, for w =ĉ we can construct a communication protocol B for computing f q←a such that B on every x ∈ X generates the same communication string. Using the simulation presented in the proof of Lemma 4.6 we get s G (q, a, b) ≤ 1. 
Lemma 5.2 Let S
One-phase Protocols
We start our study of one-phase protocols with considering networks that consist of one bridge player who is incident with d blocks. For the case that the order in which the bridge player communicates with the blocks is fixed for all inputs, we give a relationship between the size of the information source of one-phase protocols and communication size of multi-party one-way protocols. We prove that for some Boolean functions there exists no fixed order that minimizes the loss of information of all one-phase protocols. On the other hand we show that for every symmetric Boolean function one-phase protocols can minimize the loss of information when the bridge player sorts the blocks by increasing size. Then we present a generalization of this approach providing a simple one-phase protocol on arbitrarily connected network that is optimal for every symmetric function. Thus, restricting to one-phase protocols we are able to provide a generic protocol for symmetric functions which guarantees minimum information loss. For non-symmetric functions no such generic protocols are known so far.
Orderings
In this section we show a relationship between the size of the information source of ordered one-phase protocols and communication size. We use this result to construct optimal one-phase protocols for symmetric functions.
It is easy to see that in any 2-party communication protocol, the party that starts sending messages to the other party is independent of the input. Analogously, we can show the following fact.
Observation 6.1 Let G be a connected network with one bridge player P q and let A be a one-phase protocol on G. Then, the choice of the first block that P q exchanges messages with is independent of the actual input x i of all other players P i = P q .
Nevertheless, the communication order of P q can depend on the input of P q . A natural extension of the two-party scenario for one-way communication is a scenario in which the parties use a directed chain for communication. of d parties A 1 , . . . , A d . For a σ -ordered one-phase protocol A, we assume that the enumeration of the blocks reflects the ordering σ . Analogously to our simulation in Sect. 4, we have to determine the input bits of the parties in the chain according to the input bits of the players in the protocol. In the following we will assume that A i knows the input bits of the players in B i . Thus, each party A i has to know the input bit x q of the bridge player P q . Therefore, we will investigate the restricted function f q←a whenever we analyze the communication size of a communication protocol.
For a σ -ordered protocol A define 
Proof We use a simulation analogous to the simulation in Lemma 4.2. Let I i be the set of input positions known by the players in B i except for P q . Recall, that for a string x ∈ B n and a set I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k }, with 1 ≤ i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i k ≤ n we define the string x I ∈ B |I | as x i 1 x i 2 · · · x i k . Then for a fixed input a ∈ B of player P q we define a partition of input strings x ∈ B n , restricted the strings with x q = a as follows. 
, and
Now, we can conclude for any input x ∈ B n with x q = a:
A (q, a, 0, r q ) but not in S [i] A (q, a, 1, r q ) .
A (q, a, 0, r q ). Each possible communication sequence on the subnetwork of A 1 , . . . , A i+1 results in exactly one distribution in S
A (q, a, 1, r q ) . Thus, the lemma is proved. We finish this section with an observation on the structure of the possible communication sequences of an optimal communication protocol on a chain network  A 1 , . . . , A d . Let B 1 , . . . , B d denote the blocks of G and for any i let I i denote the set of input positions known by the players in B i except for P q . Then such an optimal communication protocol specifies the subfunctions 
Lemma 6.3 Let
f i,x := (f q←a ) ( i j =1 I j ) ← x[ i j =1 I j ]
Orderings for Symmetric Functions on One-bridge Networks
If we restrict ourselves to symmetric Boolean functions f , we can show a simple ordering for one-phase protocols on one-bridge networks that guarantees minimum information loss. In the next section this result will be extended to arbitrary 2-edgeconnected networks.
Arpe et al. [1] have proved the following for symmetric Boolean functions with a fixed partition of the input bits: for all i, S → i (B) can be minimized, if the number of bits known by the parties in the chain corresponds to the position of the party, i.e. the first party knows the smallest number of input bits, the second party knows the second smallest number, and so on.
This observation is also valid, if we count the number of communication sequences in a chain network for inputs x with f (x) = 1 and if we count the number of communication sequences in a chain network for inputs x with f (x) = 0. By combining these observations with Proposition 6.4 we obtain the following lemma. On the other hand, after finishing the computation steps with the players of the first d − 1 blocks, P q can start a protocol for computing the final function value by exchanging messages with the players of the last block. According to the definition of protocols in 2-connected graphs, no player can learn anything about the inputs of the other players that cannot be derived from its own input and the result of the function. This implies that for all a, b ∈ B and every content r q of P q random tape
To prove that a one-phase protocol A that uses an order like in Lemma 6.5 is optimal with respect to the size of the information source of the bridge player P q , it remains to show that the information source of such a protocol is also smaller than the information source of every non-ordered one-phase protocols A . However, before we prove this claim we need to introduce the auxiliary notion of quasi-ordering.
We call a protocol A quasi-ordered if for every x ∈ B n and for every content r q for P q 's random tape, there exists a one-phase ordering σ such that every communication string c with μ x (c) > 0 is σ -ordered. Note that this ordering is not necessarily the same for all inputs. However, given any input and P q 's random tape, the ordering is fixed. Below we prove an important feature of quasi-ordering saying that for every function there exists a quasi-ordered one-phase protocol which minimizes the size of the bridge players' information source. One can show that the analogous property does not hold for ordered one-phase protocols.
Fact 6.6 Let G be a connected network with one bridge player P q and d blocks. Then for every one-phase protocol A there exists a quasi-ordered one-phase protocol
A computing the same function as A such that for all a, b ∈ B and every content r q of P q 's random tape
Proof We prove this lemma by induction in the number of blocks of the graph. The lemma follows from Observation 6.1 for every function and every connected network G with one bridge player P q and two blocks.
Let us now assume that the claim holds for every function and every connected network with one bridge player P q and d − 1 blocks. Let G be a connected network with one bridge player P q and d blocks, let f be the function we want to compute on G, and A be a one-phase protocol for computing f on G.
Assume x q = a be P q 's input bit and r q the content of P q 's random tape. According to Observation 6.1, the block with which P q starts to exchange messages is independent of the actual input x i of all other players P i = P q . Thus the index i 1 of the block, that we denote here as B i 1 , can be determined by a and r q . For every input x ∈ B n with x q = a the first unit sequence has to determine the type of the subfunction f 1,x . Recall, the subfunctions f i,x are defined in (1).
Let F be the set of all different subfunctions f 1,x (recall, x ∈ B n with x q = a). Let t = |F |. For every subfunction h j ∈ F letx be a fixed input with h = f 1,x and let c j be a string that describes the communication between P q and B i 1 on inputx with positive probability. Let A j be the part of the protocol in which A continues its computation after seeing c j . Then for every b ∈ B the following inequality holds: q, a, b, r q ) .
By the induction hypothesis for every j ∈ [t] there exists a quasi-ordered protocol A j that computes the same function f j on the same network as A j and s A j (q, a, b, r q ) ≥ s A j (q, a, b, r q ) .
On the other hand, for every input x the bridge player P q can determine the subfunctions f 1,x on the block B i 1 privately. Denote the corresponding protocol by A 0 . Now, let A be the quasi-ordered one-phase protocol that we get by combining the protocol  A 0 and A 1 , . . . , A t . Then
The claim follows, since both A and A are one-phase protocols for computing the same function. Now we are ready to give the main result of this section. Proof If A is an ordered protocol then the claim follows directly from Lemma 6.5.
By contradiction let us assume that there exists a non-ordered one-phase protocol A such that for every ordered one-phase protocols A there exist a, b ∈ B for which
By Fact 6.6 we can assume that A is quasi-ordered. In the following we will assume, that π is a one-phase ordering that enumerates the blocks of G according to their size and fulfills the following additional property: Note that in the sum above we can count degrees of disorders of some communication strings c multiple times, e.g. if for x, x ∈ B n and some r q and r q we have μ x (c) > 0 and μ x (c) > 0 then we count (c) at least twice.
Now let A -a quasi-ordered one-phase protocol fulfilling property (2), be such that additionally A has a minimum degree of disorder A over all quasi-ordered one-phase protocols fulfilling (2) . We will show that existence of such protocol A leads to a contradiction.
Let k ∈ [d] be the maximum integer such that for somex ∈ B,r q , andĉ, with μ x (ĉ) > 0, the suffix
ofĉ has exactly one disorder, i.e. if blocks B i j correspond to the units unit j (ĉ) then there exists a block B i k with k > k such that B i k is ranged before B i k with respect to π .
Let A be the part of the protocol of A that determines the behavior of P q with input bitx q and content of random taper q after receiving A (q, a, b) ≥ s A o (q, a, b) . Thus, A o satisfies (2). Moreover, from the construction it follows that the degree of disorder A o of A o is properly smaller than the degree of disorder A of A . But this contradicts our assumption that A has a minimum degree of disorder over all quasi-ordered one-phase protocols fulfilling (2).
An Optimal One-phase Protocol for Symmetric Functions
The result of the previous section can be generalized to networks with more than one bridge player. For a given bridge player P q let G 1 , . . . , G k be the connected subgraphs obtained by deleting P q with |G i | ≤ |G i+1 |. We say that P q works in increasing order, if it starts communicating with G 1 , then with G 2 and so on. (i, a, b) ≤ s A (i, a, b) .
Proof Assume G is a 2-edge-connected network. Let P q be any bridge node in G and let G q (1) , . . . , G q (d q ) be the connected subgraphs obtained by deleting P q . Without loss of generality let us assume that the subgraphs are enumerated in such a way that
For an example graph see Fig. 1 . Our aim is to construct an increasing-ordered one-phase protocol which minimizes the loss of information among all one-phase protocols. Performing our protocol, every bridge node P q should communicate first with G q (1) then with G q (2) , and so on. The optimality of our protocol will follow easily from Proposition 6.4 and Lemma 6.7. The main problem we have to solve is how the bridge players synchronize the computations.
The computation proceeds in a tree-like fashion. Among all bridge players we distinguish one so called root player description of which will be given below. The remaining (non-root) bridge players P q will communicate successively with subgraphs G q (1) , G q (2) , . . . , G q (d q − 1) to determine information which is sufficient to compute the goal function f when the communication of P q is restricted only to the subgraph G q (d q ). The root player, which we denote as Pq , computes finally the function f communicating with the subgraphs Gq (1), Gq (2), . . . , Gq (dq ) in this order.
We choose as root the bridge node Pq satisfying
for every bridge player P q . If there are more players fulfilling this condition, we chose one of them as the root arbitrarily. Now we are ready to describe the algorithm. We start with the description for nonroot players. Let P q be such a player and let I i be the set of indices of the players in G q (i). For easier notion let I 0 = {q}. Thus x[I 0 ] denotes just input bit x q . Player P q performs iteratively d q − 1 stages, for i = 1, . . . , d q − 1, to determine functions
To this end, for any i, P q chooses an arbitrary string α i over B of length | For example, for the graph G shown in Fig. 1 player P 1 determines first the function f 1,x communicating with the graph G 1 (1) (in the figure this is the subgraph with label 2 denoting its size) and next the function f 2,x communicating with G 1 (2) (i.e. the subgraph with label 3). Then P 1 takes part in computations performed by bridge players contained in G 1 (3) . In our example the subgraph
Similarly player P 2 communicates first with G 2 (1), next with G 2 (2) (both subgraphs have label 2) to specify the function f 2,x and then P 2 takes part in computations performed by bridge players in G 2 (3), etc.
The root player Pq determines in dq stages, for i = 1, . . . , dq , functionŝ
whereÎ i denotes the set of indices of the players in Gq (i). To this end Pq proceeds analogously to the non-root players. Obviously, we have thatf dq ,x is a constant function and thatf dq ,x = f (x). Thus Pq computes f on x. The protocol is well defined if one can perform stages of bridge players in such order that for every P q and all i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ d q − 1, when P q is executing stage i then any bridge player P q contained in subgraph G q (i) has finished stages 1, 2, . . . , d q −1. For example, for the graph shown in Fig. 1 , this property is true if one executes the protocol for the bridge nodes e.g. in the following order: P 2 , P 1 , P 3 , P 5 and finally P 4 . Note that using this order, if e.g. P 3 communicates in its first stage with the graph G 3 (1) and if during this communication P 2 needs to compute a string which depends on players in G 2 (1) ∪ G 2 (2) then P 2 is able to compute such a string without any communication with players in G 2 (1) ∪ G 2 (2) since P 2 has finished its stage 1 and 2.
The global order of executions which fulfills the property above can be chosen as follows: one performs the protocol for the bridge nodes in order P q 1 , P q 2 , . . . , P q k = Pq such that
The correctness of such order follows from the following property: For every pair of bridge nodes P q and P q it is true
To see this, assume that
Now we prove that the size of the information source of every player is minimal. The protocol can be implemented in such a way that every non-bridge player does not learn anything, not even the function value. Hence, the protocol is lossless with respect to any non-bridge player and it remains considering the bridge players. The only information a bridge player P q can derive from the messages exchanged with the players of its incident blocks are the subfunctions f i,x . This sequence gives the minimum communication size S → i in a communication protocol on a chain where the parties are ordered according to the ordering chosen by our protocol. If the function computed is symmetric, we can apply Proposition 6.4 and Lemma 6.7 to show that the ordering of the blocks for computing the sequence is optimal with respect to the size of the information source.
Corollary 6.9
The protocol presented in the proof of Theorem 6.8 is optimal for onephase computations of symmetric functions with respect to the size of the information source.
A Phase Hierarchy
In this section we show that there are functions for which the size of the information source of some player for a (k − 1)-phase protocol is exponentially larger than for a k-phase protocol. The natural candidate for proving such results is the pointer jumping function p j : Our network G has two blocks A and B, one of size n log n and the other of size n log n + 1, sharing one bridge player P i . For simplicity we assume that A and B are complete subgraphs. The input bits represent two lists of n pointers, each of length log n bits. The input bit of P i belongs to the list of the smaller component. Starting with some predetermined pointer of A, the task is to follow these pointers, find the j th pointer and output the parity of the bits of the j th pointer. We get the following upper bound for k-phase protocols. (Recall that k-phase protocols can simulate 2k − 1 rounds, since each phase except for the first one can simulate two communication rounds.)
Proof The players holding the bits of a particular pointer send their bits to P i . (If A or B is not a complete graph, then the protocol can be modified such that it is private for the players other than P i as follows: Each player sends his bit masked with a random bit on one path to P i and the random bit on another path. This is possible since A and B are blocks. Furthermore, all other players of the block do the same, but with two random bits. This is done to prevent players from learning something by not getting a message.) Then P i informs the players to which the received pointer points. The informed players send their bits to P i and so on. After 2k − 1 iterations, P i simply computes the parity of the last pointer received. In this way, P i learns O(k log n) bits.
In the worst-case, all pointers involved point from A to B and vice versa. In this case, the number of phases is k.
Define DC j and CP j in the same manner as DC and CP, but by minimizing over j -round communication protocols instead of arbitrary communication protocols. The following lemma remains to be proved.
Lemma 7.3 For any Boolean function
Proof Consider a protocol tree T for f with j rounds that has a minimum number of leaves. We modify T as follows: Consider the subtree S induced by nodes belonging to the first round. We can replace S by a balanced tree without changing the outcome of the protocol. Then we change all subtrees corresponding to the second round in the same manner and so forth. Call the resulting tree T . By construction, T has still j rounds and the number of leaves of T and T are the same. But each subtree corresponding to a particular round is balanced. Consider a longest path P in T and let h 1 , . . . , h j be the length of the subpaths of P corresponding to the rounds 1, . . . , j , respectively. The number of leaves of T is at least j i=1 2 h i −1 , since we balanced all subtrees belonging to a particular round. In particular,
Therefore, log CP j (f ) ≥ h/j − 1 + log j , which proves the claim.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have considered distributed protocols in "non-private" environments: networks that are connected but not 2-connected. Since private computation of arbitrary Boolean functions is impossible on such networks, we have introduced a new measure for the information that can be inferred from seeing particular communication strings and discussed some general properties of protocols with respect to this measure. A natural question that arises is finding optimal protocols for some concrete functions.
For common Boolean functions like e.g. threshold (f n 0 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1 if and only if n i=1 x i ≥ n 0 , particularly disjunction (n 0 = 1), conjunction (n 0 = n), and majority (n 0 = n+1 2 )) and counting modulo p (i.e. g p (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1 if and only if n i=1 x i ≡ 0 (mod p)), we can prove that the information loss to any player does not depend on the ordering in which a one-phase protocol computes any of these functions, if each block has size at least n 0 and p, respectively. Proof It suffices to prove the proposition for networks consisting of a single bridge player P q incident with k blocks (k ≥ 2).
We start with considering g p . Since any block has size at least p − 1, there have to be p different strings P q can receive from k − 1 of its incident block (all but the one he communicates with last). This is independent of the ordering, in which he communicates with his incident blocks. The claim of the proposition follows immediately. Now let us consider f n 0 . For the first block P q communicates with, there are exactly n 0 + 1 possibilities that have to be distinguished: 0 ones, 1 one, . . . , n 0 − 1 ones, and n 0 ones (which means that the result is one independently of the input bits hold in the other blocks). If P q receives m ∈ [n 0 ] ∪ {0}, there remain n 0 + 1 − m possibilities to distinguish and so on. None of the considerations depends on the ordering in which P q communicates with his incident blocks, since any of these blocks has size at least n 0 . The proposition follows.
If we have blocks consisting of less than p − 1 nodes, there can be a difference in the size of P q 's information source depending on the order. Consider a network consisting of one block of size, say, k < p − 1 and another block of size n − k ≥ p − 1. Our aim is to find out, whether the number of ones is 0 (mod p). If P q starts his communication with the smaller block, the size of his information source is clearly k + 1. On the other hand, if he starts his communication with the larger block, the size of his information source is k + 2: For any 0 ≤ i ≤ k we have a string saying "the result is 1 if there are exactly k ones in the smaller block" plus one string saying "result 1 cannot be achieved anymore". This observation can easily be modified for threshold functions.
In general, the size of the information source while communicating in one order can be exponentially larger than the size obtained by communication in another order. This is true, even if we restrict ourselves to symmetric functions.
Proposition 8.2
There is a symmetric function f , a network G with one bridge player P q , and two orderings σ and σ such that s G (q, 1, 1, σ ) =  (log s G (q, 1, 1, σ ) ).
Proof For ∈ N, let n = 2 − 1. Thus, we use the lower part of the sum y of the inputs bits to address a bit in the higher part of y. The network we use will be quite simple. We have two blocks consisting of 2 d and n − 2 d − 1 nodes, respectively. (Note that n = (2 2 d ) .) Furthermore, we have a bridge player P q which is part of both blocks. If P q starts communication with the smaller block, we can easily achieve that the size of his information source is at most 2 d + 1.
It remains to show that the size of P q 's information source is at least 2 −d−1 , thus exponentially larger. If the size of his information source is smaller, there are at least two different indistinguishable input strings w and w for the larger block with #w and #w ones such that #w ≡ 0 (mod 2) d+1 and #w ≡ 0 (mod 2) d+1 . Let v be an input string with #v ones for the smaller block such that the d + 1 + #v's bit of #w and #w is different. The function value on w and w together with v is different. But since w and w are indistinguishable and v is fixed, the protocol computes the same result for either input, a contradiction.
For one-phase protocols for symmetric Boolean functions, we have been able to minimize the number of bits a player learns for all players simultaneously. An obvious question concerns minimizing the loss of more than one bridge player simultaneously for general functions. In any one-phase protocol for f , either P z 1 or P z 3 learns at least 2n bits, the other one learns at least n + 1 bits. Now we want to prove that this is optimal: The sum of bits learned by P z 1 and P z 3 is always at least 3n + 1. There are three different possibilities of one-way communication for this graph: all communication goes from left to right or from right to left or both blocks B X and B Y send to B Z . Due to symmetry, we restrict ourselves to considering the first and third case.
We first consider the case that all communication goes from left to right. Assume that P z 1 learns less than 2n bits while z 1 = 0. Then there are at least two different inputs x 0 , x 1 and x 0 , x 1 that are indistinguishable for the middle and the right component. Assume w.l.o.g. that x 0 = x 0 . Choose z 2 and z 3 such that = 0. Then either for y 0 = x 0 or for y 0 = x 0 we get a wrong function value. We can argue similarly to prove that P z 3 has to learn n + 1 bits. Otherwise, either is unknown in B Y or there are at least two different possible strings to compare with. In either case we obtain a contradiction.
Now we consider the case that both blocks B X and B Y send to the B Z . We can argue similarly as in the previous case: If P z 1 learns less than 2n bits, there are at least two different inputs for B X that cannot be distinguished. The same holds for the right component. Thus, both P z 1 and P z 3 must learn at least 2n bits each.
On the other hand, using two phases we can achieve the minimum loss of n + 1 bits to each bridge player. Compute and send it to both blocks B X and B Y . Then these blocks send x and y , respectively, to B Z , which finally computes f .
It is open whether there exist functions and networks that do not allow to minimize the loss to each bridge player simultaneously. If such functions exist, it would be interesting trying to minimize some function depending on the information loss to each player instead of minimizing the loss to each player separately. One simple example one might want to examine is the sum of loss to each player.
Other future work is to generalize the model to t-privacy: How much information does any group of at most t players learn while computing the function?
